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CONNELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY V.
PLUMBERS LOCAL 100: NEW LIMITS ON
LABOR'S ANTITRUST IMMUNITY?
Local 100 of the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union was a party to a
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement with approximately
75 plumbing and mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area.1 The
agreement contained a "most favored nation" clause which in effect
guaranteed the same contract terms to all subcontractors who were
parties to the agreement.2 As part of its campaign to organize other
subcontractors, the union demanded that Connell Construction Company, a general contractor (hereafter referred to as Connell), agree to
subcontract all plumbing and mechanical work in its various construction projects to firms that had signed collective bargaining agreements
with the union.- Connell was neither a party to any collective bargaining agreement with the union nor an employer of any union members,
and the agreement in question expressly disclaimed any intent on the
part of the union to seek to organize Connell's employees.4 When
Connell initially refused to sign the agreement, the union picketed one
of its major construction sites. After the picketing stopped work at that
1. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 619 (1975).
2. Id.
3. The agreement provided:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the construction industry, and
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement applying
in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the LaborManagement Relations Act;
WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not
grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor; and
WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided
herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with
his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to other firms;
THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to
work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be done at the site of
construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure, or other works,
that [if] the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work
falling within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall
contract or subcontract such work only to firms that are parties to an executed,
current collective bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
Id. at 619-20. At the time the union was attempting to secure this agreement with
Connell, it was conducting similar campaigns with other general contractors in the
Dallas area. Id. at 621.
4. Id. at 619. "[T]he contractor does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition
as the collective bargaining representative .
Id. at 620, quoting the union-Connell
subcontracting agreement.
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job site, Connell signed the agreement under protest and sought to have
it invalidated as a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibit agreements that restrain trade or tend to create a
monopoly.5 The basis of the action was Connell's contention that the
agreement restricted its business operations.6
The district court upheld the agreement as valid under section 8(e)
of the amended National Labor Relations Act (hereafter NLRA).7
That proviso specifically exempts subcontracting agreements in the
construction industry from the Act's general prohibition of agreements
by employers to cease doing business with other employersA The court
concluded that since the agreement was valid under the federal labor
statutes, it was not subject to a challenge under the federal antitrust

5. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor ...... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
When the union initiated the picketing, Connell filed its initial suit in state court for
an injunction under the state antitrust laws. When the union successfully removed the
case to the federal district court, Connell signed the agreement and amended the complaint to frame it in terms of the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 620-21.
6. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1165 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd in part, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
7. 421 U.S. at 621.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)
of this section the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an
industry affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms
"any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any
other person" shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer,
contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the
apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter
shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing
exception.
See text accompanying notes 20-27 infra.
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laws. 9 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, 10 but on the ground that the union's
activity was within the scope of a labor union exemption from the

antitrust laws defined in earlier Supreme Court rulings.11 In a 5-to-4
decision the Supreme Court, in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
Local 100,12 reversed on the issue of federal antitrust immunity and
found that, in addition to being outside the construction industry
proviso of section 8(e), the union was subject to liability for possible
violations of the federal antitrust laws.' 3
The agreement at issue was one form of what is commonly termed
a "hot cargo" contract. The term was originally applied to an agreement by which employees could refuse to work with or handle goods
produced by "unfair" employers, those with whom the union had a
grievance. 14 Eventually a hot cargo contract came to refer to any agreement between an employer and a union under which the employer
agreed to avoid doing business with any other person. Prior to the 1959
amendments to the NLRA,"s such clauses were often incorporated into
collective bargaining agreements-labor unions insisted on their inclusion because they provided a loophole in the ban on secondary
boycotts contained in section 8(b)(4). 1 6 The belief that hot cargo clauses
9. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014 (N.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). The district
court also ruled that the agreement did not violate the state antitrust laws. Id.
On appeal, this ruling was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court affirmed this part of
the decision under the federal preemption doctrine stated in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421
U.S. 616, 635 (1975).
10. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd
in part, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
11. The Fifth Circuit, citing United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),
and Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), determined that absent a
conspiracy with nonlabor groups to injure the business of other nonlabor groups, conduct
involving legitimate union interests was entitled to exemption from the antitrust laws.
483 F.2d at 1162-65. See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
12. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
13. 421 U.S. at 635. The Court remanded for a determination of whether any violation
of the Sherman Act had, in fact, occurred. Id. at 637.
14. NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 31 (9th Cir. 1964). See
generally 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 5222 (1972).
15. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
16. Section 8(b)(4) provided in relevant part that it was unlawful for a union
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
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provided a loophole in section 8(b)(4) stemmed mainly from the
position adopted initially by the National Labor Relations Board that
section 8(b)(4) contained no prohibition against voluntarily entering
and honoring such an agreement. 17 Thus, the same type of activity
made illegal by section 8(b)(4) was legal if provided for by contractual
arrangement. The legality of hot cargo contracts became a source of
conflict among the circuit courts and the Board as they became more
widespread.-l The conflict culminated in a 1958 Supreme Court decision that although a hot cargo clause was not a valid defense to a
section 8(b)(4) action against a union for illegal secondary activity, the
clause itself was not illegal.' 9 Congress, apparently believing the Court's
limitations insufficient to close the loopholes in secondary boycott
legislation, enacted section 8(e) just 1 year later to totally outlaw hot
cargo agreements.2 0 In addition, section 8(b)(4) was amended to make
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person ....
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1970)).
17. Teamsters Local 294, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), afJ'd sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB,
195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Chauffeurs Local 135, 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953); Burstein, A
Decisional History of the "Hot Cargo" Clause, 26 I.C.C. PPAc. J. 292 (1958); Comment,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 724 (1960).
18. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 294, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd sub nom. Rabouin v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952) ("hot cargo" clauses valid and operate as a defense
to a § 8(b)(4) charge); Truck Drivers Local 728, 119 N.L.R.B. 399 (1957) modified, 265
F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959) ("hot cargo" contracts involving common carriers repugnant to the policy of the act and void at their inception);
General Drivers Local 886, 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956) modified, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
rev'd sub nom. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (the Act does not
forbid execution of "hot cargo" clauses but does preclude their enforcement by means
of concerted activity prohibited in § 8(b)(4)); Teamsters Local 554, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769
(1954) ("hot cargo" clauses invalid as contrary to public policy).
One author breaks the varying viewpoints into three categories:
(1) [T]he liberal approach, and the one first adopted by the NLRB, that a "hotcargo" contract in a collective bargaining agreement removed from the statutory
prohibition union activity, which, absent the contract, would clearly be a violation
of Section 8(b)(4) of the act, (2) the strict view, that a "hot-cargo" clause was illegal
per se, the mere execution of such a clause constituting an unfair labor practice, and
(3) the compromise position, and the one finally approved by the Supreme Court in
the Sand Door case, that the clause itself was valid, but that it could not serve to
immunize from the reach of Section 8(b)(4) a strike, or inducement of employees
to engage in a work stoppage, for an object proscribed by the law.
Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 724, 740 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
19. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (commonly known as the
Sand Door case).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). The full text of § 158(e) is reproduced in note 8 supra.
The Sand Door decision failed to consider pressures that could be exerted upon an employer to voluntarily enforce such clauses contained in collective bargaining agreements.
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the use of coercive methods to obtain such an agreement with any
21
employer an unfair labor practice.

However, Congress specifically exempted from section 8(e) unionemployer agreements in the garment industry, and union-employer
agreements relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to
be done on the jobsite in the construction industry.22 The inclusion of
For example, the Taft-Hartley Act gave the union legal recourse for the employer's breach
of the collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Furthermore, employers
in most cases honor the clause rather than face a new round of negotiations with the
unions, negotiations which would be necessary if the contract became void as a result of
the employer's breach. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634-35
(1967); Cox, The Landrum-Griflin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REv. 257, 270-72 (1959); Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1176, 1178 (1964); Comment, supra
note 18, at 741.
In addition, it appeared likely that employers would be under pressure from unions to
include hot cargo clauses in contracts. These possibilities, coupled with concern over the
ineffectiveness of secondary boycott legislation, probably pushed Congress to enact the
broad prohibition against hot cargo agreements. "The only way of dealing with such
pressures is to nip them in the bud by prohibiting the agreements." Cox, supra at 272.
Initially, union leaders were concerned about the potentially broad scope of § 8(e) as
it applied to subcontracting clauses. Read literally, the provision seemed to prohibit all
clauses relating to or limiting subcontracting "because, in some measure, each subcontracting clause requires the general employer to promise to cease or refrain from doing
business with subcontractors." Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1176, 1179 (1964). Early cases generally
determined the relationship of § 8(e) to subcontracting clauses on the basis of whether
the clause had a primary or secondary effect. See, e.g., NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 28 (9th Cir. 1964); Meat & Highway Drivers Local 710 v. NLRB,
335 F.2d 709, 713-16 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539,
548 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1964). It appears, then, that § 8(e)
was not the "death knell for the subcontracting clause." Comment, Subcontracting Clauses
and Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. Rav. 1176, 1179 & n.16
(1964). The construction industry received special treatment in § 8(e); see text accompanying notes 22-25 infra.
21. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor
or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section [.]
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1970).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). The Board initially took the position that § 158(b)(4)
(ii)(A) proscribed picketing or other secondary pressure to secure a "hot cargo" agreement
even if the clause itself was valid under the construction industry proviso to § 158(e).
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 139 N.L.R.B. 236, 239 (1962); Construction Local 383,
137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 1651-52 (1962). Following reversals on this position by the Ninth
Circuit, Construction Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963), the District of
Columbia Circuit, Painters Local 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and the
Third Circuit, Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964), the Board
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the construction industry proviso was a formal recognition of the
unique relationship between contractors and subcontractors on a single
jobsite and the difficulty of distinguishing between primary and secondary employers.23 Prohibiting the subcontracting agreements in the
construction industry under section 8(e) would have done little to
further the purpose of secondary boycott legislation, that is, of protecting neutral secondary employers from involvement in disputes between
unions and primary employers2 4 Moreover, permitting such agreements promoted labor peace in the construction industry by helping
of
to avoid the inevitable tensions resulting from the employment
25
site.
construction
same
the
on
labor
nonunion
union and
formally adopted the position that economic force may be used to secure agreements
valid under the construction proviso to § 158(e) notwithstanding § 158(b)(4), because
§ 158(b)(4) incorporates the § 158(e) proviso by reference. Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854, 856 (1964). See also, Grove, Obtaining and Enforcing HotCargo Contracts in the Construction Industry, 51 A.B.A.J. 732, 734 (1965); Brinker, Hot
Cargo Cases in the Construction Industry Since 1958, 22 LAB. L.J. 690, 698-99 (1971);
Batlett, The Hot-Cargo Clause, 12 ALBERTA L. REV. 378, 392-93 (1974); Note, The Effect
of the 1959 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 ORE. L. REv. 301, 314-15
(1965).
23. The construction industry proviso to § 158(e) was at least in part an effort to
offset the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951). In Denver, the Court asserted that general contractors and subcontractors on a common jobsite were secondary employers as to each other and thus action
taken against one employer that caused a work stoppage on the jobsite could be deemed
unlawful secondary activity as to the other employers on the jobsite. Id. at 689-90.
Congress recognized that the integrated nature of the construction industry made this
reasoning inapplicable-employers on a jobsite were extremely unlikely to be disinterested
neutral employers with respect to labor disputes between a union and other employers
on the site. See 105 CONG. REC. 17881 (1959) (remarks by Senator Morse); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633-39 (1967); Brinker, supra note 22, at
691.
24. "The overriding purpose of these secondary boycott provisions is to protect
'unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.'" NLRB
v. Local 3, IBEW, 477 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1973). See also NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (1971); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 692 (1951); Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
NLRB v. Local 769, IBEW, 405 F.2d 159, 163 (9th Cir. 1968).
25. As stated by Justice Douglas:
The employment of union and nonunion men on the same job is a basic protest
in trade union history.
The presence of a subcontractor does not alter one whit the realities of the
situation; the protest of the union is precisely the same. In each the union was
trying to protect the job on which union men were employed.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692-93 (1951) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). See also Acco Constr. Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 851 (9th
Cir. 1975); Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Council of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964); Comment, The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CoRN. L.Q. 724, 751-52 (1960).
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The Connell Court suggested that these policy considerations might
validate some subcontracting agreements if they were entered into outside the context of a collective bargaining relationship. 26 But the agreement in this case, entered into outside the context of a collective
bargaining relationship, was unrelated to any of the policies and,
27
therefore, was not entitled to an exemption from section 8(e). Of
particular significance to the Court was the union's admission that the
picketing was conducted for the sole purpose of organizing subcontractors; sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(7)2 8 prohibit the use of most secondary tactics and primary picketing for organizational purposes.
The Court found that permitting subcontracting agreements under
these circumstances would do nothing to further the policies behind
the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) and would create a
dangerous loophole in restrictions on organizing tactics established in
other sections of the NLRA.29
Because of the union's unfair labor practice, then, it was clear that

26. 421 U.S. at 633. The Court indicates that any agreement relating to the subcontracting of work in the construction industry in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement will be valid under § 158(e), but that without that relationship the agreement
must be justifiable in terms of the policy behind § 158(e). It is clear from earlier Board
decisions that this distinction has not been drawn in the past. Building & Constr. Trades
Council (B & J Investment Co.), 214 N.L.R.B. 562, 87 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1974); Building
& Constr. Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854, 857 (1964). The union in Connell relied on
the B & J Investment case, supra, in which a general contractor who was not signatory to
any collective bargaining agreement was pressured to sign an agreement to cease doing
business with nonunion subcontractors. The Board upheld the agreement as valid. The
Connell Court rejected the argument, noting that it was not ascertainable whether the
Board had considered the absence of a collective bargaining relationship. 421 U.S. at
631-32 n.10. It seems clear that the Connell decision will cause subcontracting agreements
in the construction industry to be subjected to a closer examination for validity under
§ 158(e) if they are entered into outside of a collective bargaining relationship.
27. The Court noted that the union activity did not amount to a labor dispute with
one employer at a construction site. This eliminated the policy justification for the application of § 158(e) that all employers on the site were involved in a labor dispute with
the union. See note 20 supra.
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), (7) (1970). A § 158(b)(7) violation takes place when
the picketing is designed to pressure the employer into recognizing the union or to
pressure employees into joining the union. It is not necessary that this be the primary
object; it must only be one of the objects. NLRB v. Council of Carpenters, 387 F.2d
170, 173 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 182, 514 F.2d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir.
1963); Local 840, AFL-CIO, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1167 n.28 (1962).
29. 421 U.S. at 631-32. On December 22, 1975, President Ford announced his intention
to veto H.R. 5900, known as the common situs picketing bill. House Bill 5900 had been
introduced to amend § 158(b)(4) and permit picketing at the common site of a construction project, thus negating the effect of the Denver decision. The bill would have
abolished any distinction between primary and secondary employers among the general
contractors and subcontractors at a single jobsite. H.R. REP. No. 697, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1975).
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Connell had a claim against the union under federal labor laws. ° The
Court went beyond an unfair labor practice theory of liability, however,
and held that Connell was entitled to bring an action under the
Sherman Act." By doing so, the Court raised the long-standing conflict between labor policies encouraging the organization of labor and
collective bargaining and antitrust policies promoting a competitive
atmosphere in business markets. The conflict is inevitable, for as one
author notes, "[t]he factor of restraint is inherent in collective bargaining upon both the employer and union; the elimination of restraint is
' 32
the primary task of the antitrust laws."
The Sherman Act, passed in the early days of the labor movement,
immediately became a primary weapon for opponents of organized
labor. 33 Congress attempted to alleviate the wide-spread prosecution of
labor unions under the Sherman Act by establishing in the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts34 antitrust immunity for many labor union
30. Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), as amended
by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin), provides that any one injured by reason of the commission of an unfair labor practice may
sue in any federal district court for compensatory damages. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
31. 421 U.S. at 635. Relevant parts of the Sherman Act are reproduced at note 5
supra.
32. Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of Conflicting National Policies,
Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 22 MERCER L. Rav. 561 (1971). See also Meltzer, Labor
Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 659 (1965).
33. Numerous authors have discussed the widespread antitrust prosecution of labor
unions that took place before 1941. See, e.g., Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963);
Meltzer, supra note 32, at 661-70; Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 742 (1966).
34. Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor .. .organizations . . .or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). Under § 20 of the Act, certain activities by labor unions, including
striking, picketing, boycotting and peacefully persuading others to strike, picket or boycott,
will not be "considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1970).
The above sections of the Clayton Act, passed in 1921, were strictly construed by the
Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The Court,
seizing upon the portion of § 6 which frees labor organizations from the antitrust laws
for lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects, held that the exemption would be allowed only where the methods and objectives of the union were deemed to be lawful. Id.
at 469-74. This amounted to an independent judicial determination of the social desirability of particular union goals and effectively limited the force of §§ 6 and 20. In 1932, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to limit the power of federal courts to issue injunctions
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activities. The actual scope of this exemption for labor has been a
matter of controversy since its origin; the Connell decision represents
another chapter in the efforts of the courts to define that scope.
The broad scope of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia exemption
first received formal recognition by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Hutcheson35 Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter
stated: "So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding
the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means."

36

The Hutcheson requirements for inclusion in the Clayton

Act exemption-that the union act alone and only in its self-interest7
received further emphasis in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 IBEWA
That case held that even where the labor union acted to increase wages
and job security, it violated the antitrust laws by combining with
employees and manufacturers to restrain trade. 8
The next major attempt to define the antitrust exemption for labor
activity came in two landmark cases decided on the same day in 1965,
9
and Amalgamated Meat Cutters
United Mine Workers v. Pennington40
v. Jewel Tea Co.
In Pennington, Justice White's majority opinion noted that the
union had conspired with one group of employers to impose fixed wage
requirements on all employers in the area, including some that were
not parties to the agreement. In addition, the union did not consider
the employer's ability to pay the fixed wage. On this basis, the Court
in cases arising out of labor disputes and to give a broader meaning to the term "labor
dispute." 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). The Norris-LaGuardia Act effectively restored the
intended power of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 233-34 (1941); Siegel, Connolly & Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for LaborMagna Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13 Duq. L. Rav. 411, 437-39 (1975).
35. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
36. Id. at 232.
37. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
38. Id. at 810. The Court noted that whether specific conduct on the part of a labor
union was exempt from the antitrust laws depended upon whether the union acted alone
or in concert with business groups. Id.
39. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In the 20 years between the Allen Bradley decision and the
Pennington-Jewel Tea decisions, the Supreme Court made no other rulings. Frequent
attempts in Congress to pass legislation in the area failed. See Comment, Labor's Antitrust
Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 742, 746 & n.34 (1966).
For an extensive analysis of the Pennington-Jewel Tea opinions, see Di Cola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 705 (1972);
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 BOSTON L. REV. 317
(1966).
40. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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denied the union any exemption from the antitrust laws. 41 Justice
White found the effect of the conspiracy to be clearly contrary to the
policies behind the antitrust laws, and the resulting agreement to have
no redeeming support from national labor policy. 42 The majority
opinion in Jewel Tea, also written by Justice White, discussed more
clearly the need implicitly suggested in Pennington for a balance
between labor and antitrust policies. 43 After Pennington it was clear
that the national labor policies were not strong enough to justify the
restraint on trade caused by a conspiracy between a union and nonlabor groups to injure the business of other nonlabor groups. In
Jewel Tea, however, no conspiracy was involved. 44 Justice White
found that absent a Pennington conspiracy, the national labor policy
will outweigh the national antitrust policy if the activity at issue is
"intimately related" to the employees' wages, hours, and working
4
conditions. 5
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Pennington and dissenting
opinion in Jewel Tea, both joined by Justices Clark and Black, relied
heavily on Allen Bradley to argue that the presence of a conspiracy
with a nonlabor group to restrict competition should be the determining factor. 4 6 Justice Goldberg, with Justices Harlan and Stewart,
dissented in Pennington and concurred in Jewel Tea, asserting that
"the Court should hold that, in order to effectuate congressional
intent, collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects
of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust
laws. ' 4 7 In a sense, Justice Goldberg was arguing for a balancing test
between labor and antitrust policies. But he rejected Justice White's
"intimately related" standard as representing a "narrow, confining

41. Id. at 660-61.
42. Id. at 667-68. Justice White argued that the union surrendered its freedom in
present or prospective collective bargaining negotiations with other employers by entering
into such an agreement with one group of employers. This thwarted the whole purpose
behind the national labor policy.
43. 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
44. Id. at 688. The union was picketing to secure clauses which restricted the marketing hours of stores in collective bargaining agreements with several employers.
45. Id. at 689-90. But Justice White footnoted the "intimately related" language by
saying that the "crucial determinant" was "not the form of the agreement . . . but its
relative impact on the product market and the interests of union members." Id. at 690
n.5. This added ambiguity to the "intimately related" standard because it seemed to
indicate that a significant amount of restraint on the market would in some instances
warrant disregard of the union members' immediate and direct concerns. See Di Cola,
supra note 39, at 721-22.
46. 381 U.S. 657, 672-74 (1965); 381 U.S. 676, 735-38 (1965).
47. 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965).
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view of what labor unions have a legitimate interest in preserv48
ing ....
Thus, neither Pennington nor Jewel Tea presented a clear majority
view as to the scope and application of the labor exemption. The
lower courts which have addressed the issue since those decisions have
understandably arrived at different interpretations. The Seventh Circuit, extending the exemption to mandatory subjects of bargaining,
held that activity undertaken to secure a subcontracting agreement was
exempt from the antitrust laws under Justice Goldberg's standard. 49 In
a case in which the union had pressured the employer into agreeing
to reserve certain work for union members, the Second Circuit stated
a two-part test for determining the balance between labor and antitrust
policies: "(1) whether the action is in the union's self-interest in an
area which is a proper subject of union concern and (2) whether the
union is acting in combination with a group of employers."5 0 This
test appears to restate Justice White's viewpoint in Jewel Tea, but
the Second Circuit's "proper subject of union concern" standard is
arguably somewhat broader than Justice White's "intimately related
to wages, hours, and working conditions" standard. The Southern
District Court of New York adopted the Second Circuit's test and
noted that where the union's purpose was a legitimate union concern
and not designed to eliminate an employer's competition, the fact that
its actions constituted an unfair labor practice did not weaken its labor
exemption. 51
Prior to its decision in Connell, the Fifth Circuit, in Cedar Crest
Hats, Inc. v. United Hatters,52 had taken a view similar to that of the
Second Circuit. The court held in Cedar Crest that in the absence of a
conspiracy with nonunion groups to create a business monopoly, a
union acting solely in its self-interest does not violate the antitrust
laws. 53 Following this reasoning at the appellate level in Connell,54 the
48. Id. at 727.
49. Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d
1, 3 (7th Cir. 1965).
50. Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d
884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970). "The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the preservation of
jobs is within the area of proper union concern. Union activity having as its objective the
preservation of jobs for union members is not violative of the antitrust laws." Id. (Citations omitted).
51. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 986-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
52. 362 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 326.
54. 483 F.2d at 1166-68. The Court found that the evidence did not support the existence of a Pennington-type conspiracy and that therefore the Jewel Tea criteria were
determinative of the case. "We are thus left with a situation quite similar to Jewel Tea in
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Fifth Circuit determined that since there was no allegation of any
conspiracy between the union and a nonlabor group and since the
agreement related to the legitimate union interest of organizing subcontractors, the exemption was available to Local 100.55 The court
concluded that it was immaterial whether the activity of the union
56
constituted an unfair labor practice.
57
In a case decided after Connell, the Fifth Circuit took the lenient

position that union action remained outside of the antitrust laws even
if the purpose was to injure or eliminate some employers' business-so
long as the union did not combine with an employer or employer
group to effectuate that purpose. In Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ.
v. Ross Aviation, Inc., the court feared that unless the presence of a
conspiracy was the lower limit of the test for the labor exemption in
cases involving union-employer agreements, employers would begin
antitrust suits as a "routine response to union contract demands ....

-8

The Ninth Circuit, determining whether the labor union exemption
extended to farmworkers' unions, 59 expressed the same view. In that
case, the union was charged with boycotting the grapes of producers
who did not recognize the union. Producers who recognized the union
were not boycotted. Plaintiffs alleged that this constituted a combination between those employers and the union, resulting in an unfair
advantage over producers who failed to recognize the union. In holding
that this was not the type of combination condemned by Pennington,
that, once the conspiracy to monopolize drops out, the only remaining claim of plaintiff is
that the agreement interferes with his right to conduct his business as he wishes and that
the contract requires him to forego certain methods of competition." Id. at 1166.
55. Id.
56. The Court noted that if the activity was legal under the labor laws, the union
would not be subject to liability for an antitrust violation. If the union did commit an
unfair labor practice, there were remedies available under the labor laws, "[b]ut no where
has Congress ever said that a violation of the labor laws should give rise to treble antitrust damages, possible criminal punishments, and attorney's fees for plaintiffs." Id. at
1169-70.
57. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.
1974).
58. Id. at 903.
59. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farmworkers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
1974). The question of the applicability of the labor exemption to farm workers unions
arose, in the Court's view, because Pennington and Jewel Tea were decided against the
total framework of national labor legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act
and the 1947 and 1959 amendments to that Act. Agricultural employees were specifically
excluded from coverage under these acts. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the exemption rested on the Supreme Court's decision in Hutcheson, which was based on the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, which did not exclude agricultural employees. Without any indication by Congress that the labor exemption was to have a more limited
application to farm worker unions, the Court concluded that such unions were not to be
exempted. Id. at 553-56.
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the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the restriction was designed to promote
bargaining rather than to inhibit the union's ability to bargain. 0 The
court further stated:
The mere combination by a union with "non-labor groups" does
not violate the Sherman Act. To hold otherwise would invalidate
collective bargaining. Whether the combination violates the antitrust
laws turns on the purposes served thereby. Here it is clear that the

overwhelmingly predominant purpose of the union was to secure the
objective of recognition by the plaintiffs. This is enough to insulate
the combination from laws designed primarily to proscribe combina6

tions between business groups.

The Connell decision appears to reject the notion that a union
acting with no other objective than organization is insulated from the
antitrust laws when it combines with other employers to effectuate
that purpose. 62 Connell did not attempt to argue that there was a
conspiracy between the union and the subcontractors it represented;
there was no evidence of such a conspiracy.6 3 Rather, the Court apparently based its decision on the restrictive nature of the agreement
64
between the union and Connell and the other general contractors.
60. Id. at 560-61. Part of Justice White's rationale in Pennington was that the agreement to impose uniform terms on all employees restricted the unions' freedom in bargaining. See note 42 supra.
61. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 558 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546
(7th Cir. 1970), in which the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that a union violates
the antitrust laws when it agrees to impose the terms of a multi-employer agreement on
other employers not party to that agreement ("most favored nation" arrangement, see
text accompanying note 2 supra) without regard to the union's purpose for entering
such an agreement. The court stated that "the actual holding of Pennington requires
proof of the predatory purpose of the agreement between a union and the employ[T]he jury can find a violation only if it is proved that the agreement '. .. was
ers ....
made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of business.'" Id. at 553, quoting
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 673 (1965).
62. The Court stated:
This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than
organizing as many subcontractors as possible. This goal was legal, even though a
successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that unionized employers face from nonunion firms. But the methods the union chose are not
immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal.
421 U.S. at 625 (footnote omitted).
63. 421 U.S. at 625 n.2. A footnote to the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart points
out that if Connell had voluntarily entered the agreement with the union, an injured
subcontractor who was not a party to the multi-employer agreement with Local 100
might have a valid antitrust claim alleging the type of conspiracy condemned in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). 421 U.S. at 649 n.9. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
64. 421 U.S. at 623-26.
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The Court's approach is significant in that it chose to analyze the
case under the Pennington model despite the absence of any conspiracy or motive to injure the business of any employer. The case
seems more analogous to Jewel Tea6 5 in that the union in Connell
was unilaterally seeking these agreements from the area's general contractors. There the Court found that a union did not automatically
lose its antitrust exemption for seeking and executing employer agreements.

66

Moreover, by taking the Pennington approach and stressing

the union's combination with a nonlabor group, the Court may have
changed the Allen Bradley criteria for determining which unionemployer combinations will cost unions their antitrust exemption. If
the mere "combination" between the union and the employer is the
determining factor, an employer does not have to be motivated by a
desire to injure the business of a competitor for the agreement to be
condemned under a Pennington analysis. 67
Although it was the agreement between the union and Connell
that triggered the Court's application of Pennington6 the Court's real
concern was probably the restrictive effect of the agreement in conjunction with the "most favored nation" clause contained in the subcontractors' multi-employer bargaining contract. 69 The Court acknowledged that the "most favored nation" clause itself was not under attack,7 0
but it saw a potential for a conspiracy among the represented subcon65. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See note 44 supra.
This apparently was the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Connell at the lower
appellate level. See note 54 and accompanying text suplra.
66. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra. If the Connell Court had applied the
Jewel Tea test for balancing federal antitrust and labor policies, the immediate and
direct concern of union members in organizing subcontracting firms might have brought
the union's conduct within the exemption...
67. This possibility stands in sharp contrast to the approach taken by two circuit
courts which weighed heavily the presence or absence of employer motivation to injure a
competitor's business. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
68. The Court cited Allen Bradley for the proposition that a union was not protected
by any exemption from the antitrust laws if it entered an agreement with a nonlabor party
to restrain competition. The Court said the agreement with Connell placed prohibited
direct restraints on the business market. 421 U.S. at 622-23.
69. 421 U.S. at 623-25. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
70. Id. at 623. The Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that a "most favored
nation" clause in labor contracts constituted -a per se violation of the antitrust laws in
Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970).
See also Di Cola, supra note 39, at 741-42.
The NLRB has taken the position that "most favored nation" subcontracting clauses
do not violate the antitrust laws because they are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Dolly
Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (1970). The Board noted that, unlike the
wage agreement in the Pennington case, subcontracting agreements with some' employers
do not bind the union's freedom of action in bargaining with employers outside the agreements. Id. at 1038. See note 60 supra.
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tractors to monopolize the market through the union's agreements with
the area general contractors. Since all of the subcontracting firms that
were parties to the multi-employer contract had agreed not to compete
on subjects covered by the contract, the union-general contractor agreements would have eliminated competition on those subjects by foreclosing all other subcontractors from the market. The Court noted that
the union, and the subcontractors it represented through this arrangement, could effectively control the number of subcontractors competing71
for work in the area and could also exclude specific subcontractors.
The Connell Court concluded that the actual and potential anticompetitive effect of the arrangement could not be justified by any
72
federal labor policy.
In addition, two other factors appeared to have had considerable
influence on the decision: first, the nature of the agreement imposed
on Connell by the union, and second, the absence of a collective
bargaining relationship between the union and Connell. The Court
emphasized that the agreement foreclosed nonunion subcontractors
from part of the market without regard to whether those subcontractors
were operating under substandard wages and working conditions.
Nonunion subcontractors that achieved a competitive edge through
efficient operating methods would be unable to bid on subcontracting
work in the area. The Connell Court asserted that federal labor policy
offered no support for "[c]urtailment of competition based on efficiency .... 1 Moreover, since the agreement was not entered into in
the context of a collective bargaining relationship, it could not be
justified on the basis of the federal policy favoring collective bargaining. The Court implied that the agreement may have been entitled to
an anti-trust exemption had it been included in a collective bargaining
contract, notwithstanding the potentially severe restraints it may have
caused.7"
CONCLUSION

Given its specific fact situation, Connell does not represent a
substantial departure from earlier policy. The Court's analysis differs
71. 421 U.S. at 624-25. Notably, the Court condemned this power to restrict competition without any evidence of anticompetitive motivation on the part of Connell, the
employer with whom the union had "combined," to injure its competitors.
72. Id. at 625, 631.
73. Id. at 623. The Court found competition based on efficiency to be a "positive value
that the antitrust laws strive to protect." Id.
74. Id. at 625-26. The Court stated that "[t]here can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude might be entitled to an
antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
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somewhat from earlier decisions; its implicit synthesis of Pennington
and Jewel Tea indicates that it is the severity of the restraint imposed
by the union activity in question which will determine whether the
union is exempt from the antitrust sanctions. Subsequent decisions
may well limit the holding in Connell to union activity conducted
outside the context of a collective bargaining relationship and which
results in severe or potentially severe anticompetitive effects.
But the Connell decision left open several recurring questions
about concurrent liability for antitrust violations and violations of
the federal labor laws. After Connell, it is clear that conduct that may
give rise to a violation of section 8(e) of the NLRA may also be grounds
for antitrust liability. Justice Stewart, in his Connell dissent, cited
legislative history indicating that Congress intended section 8(e) to be
the sole sanction for such conduct. 75 The majority disagreed, however,

asserting there was no indication the labor law remedies for section
8(e) violations were intended to be exclusive remedies.7 6 The opinion
itself does not indicate whether any violation of the labor laws which
has a substantial anticompetitive effect on the product market will
subject a union to antitrust liability; the decision may -produce a wave
of antitrust suits against labor unions. 77 Moreover, since there is an
element of uncertainty in the area of unfair labor practices, the argument that the imposition of antitrust sanctions is too severe has some
merit.78 If the Connell decision indicates a desire of the Court to
narrow the scope of labor's antitrust exemption, both the organizing
and bargaining power of labor unions may be severely curbed.
While the potential repercussions of Connell may be viewed unfavorably by organized labor, they will be welcomed by those who have
urged that labor's antitrust immunity be weakened or eliminated. Some
commentators have suggested that organized labor has reached a level
of strength at which it is no longer justifiable to perpetuate the ex75. Id. at 639-55. Justice Stewart concluded: "The judicial imposition of 'independent
federal remedies' not intended by Congress . . . threatens 'to upset the balance of power
between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.'" Id. at 655,
quoting Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
76. Id. at 634-35 n.16.
77. Although the particular unfair labor practice in Connell involved an employerunion agreement, the mere fact of agreement has not in the past cost the union the antitrust exemption. As discussed above, however, it was the amount of restraint on the
market, and not the fact of the agreement, that was the determining factor in Connell.
Therefore, it is arguable that in subsequent cases conduct that constitutes an unfair labor
practice but does not necessarily involve an employer-union agreement may give rise to
antitrust liability if the restraints imposed on the product market by the union activity
are severe enough.
78. There is some indication in the wording of the agreement at issue in Connell that
the union believed its actions to be legitimate under § 8(e). See note 3 supra.
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emption in the name of balancing the respective power of labor and
management. 79 One notes:
The predliction [sic] of courts to find immunity for union conduct
that restrains trade, even where such conduct also subverts the
national labor policy or violates other laws, must be reversed ....
[T]he power and influence that labor unions have attained has
created an imbalance in the relative power of the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship. The nation's interest in stemming
inflation demands that this imbalance be eliminated, and that the
parties be returned to a status of equality. This, it is submitted, can
best be accomplished by narrowing the labor exemption .... 1o
Regardless of whether these arguments in favor of limiting labor's
exemption are compelling, it is unquestionable that some clarifying
action is necessary. Throughout the history of labor's antitrust immunity, courts have been unable or unwilling to define its precise
scope. Congress should decide whether the exemption should be
eliminated or continued, and if it is to continue, should establish
manageable standards for judicial application.
MARY APPLEGATE
79. Siegel, Connolly & Walker, supra note 34, at 470; Note, Secondary Boycotts Under
Labor and Antitrust: A Choice of Policy, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 653 (1974).
80. Siegel, Connolly & Walker, supra note 34, at 478-79.

